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how would they have been required to seek judicial review of the H EW
order: in a subsequently-filed pleading in the district court where the
action had originally been brought and was postponed, or in a
separate suit filed under the review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act? 2 Logic and considerations of judicial economy
suggest that additional pleadings in the original court would be the
more practical solution. But the statutory provision requiring state
appeals from HEW conformity decisions to be taken to the courts of
appeal8 3 might lead the Supreme Court to require that a separate
action be filed even by non-state litigants."

II:

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) remained controversial
during 1970; it was followed with hesitancy by administrators and
interpreted with difficulty by the courts. The Act was adopted to
facilitate public awareness of the activities of the federal government,
and it requires that certain materials, such as an agency's procedural
regulations and general policy statements, be published in the Federal
Register2 and that other materials, including final agency rulings, be
made available for public inspection and copying. 3 More importantly,
however, the Act compels the release of existing agency records which
have been sufficiently identified by the requester 4 and which are not
within any of the FOIA's nine specific exemptions.5 While some
litigation has arisen over the sufficiency of agency publication of
82. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970); see 305 F. Supp. at 1264 (suggesting the applicability
of the APA to the plaintiff-hospitals as aggrieved parties).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 316 (Supp. V, 1970).

84. The Supreme Court has recognized the potential problems in the primary jurisdiction
field caused by separate suits to review the subsequent agency action. Yet the Court neither

prohibited such bifurcation of litigation nor offered clear guidance for preventing such
duplication. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 85 (1962)

(footnote marked with an asterisk).

1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Id. § 552(a)(1).

3. Id. § 552(a)(2).
4. Id. § 552(a)(3).

5. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
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orders and policies, 6 the more important cases decided under the Act
have concerned the interpretation of the exemptions. Briefly, an
agency need not release records which concern: defense or foreign
affairs where secrecy is required by Executive Order; internal agency
personnel matters; materials exempted from disclosure by statute;
confidential trade secrets, commercial, or financial information
obtained from a person outside the agency; inter- or intra-agency
memorandums which would not be available to a party in litigation
with the agency; personnel, medical, and other files where disclosure
might cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy; law enforcement
investigatory files unless available by law to a party; certain financial
data utilized by agencies in regulating financial institutions; and
7
geological information concerning oil wells.
The year 1970 began with many unresolved issues remaining from
1969. Was there an equity power in the federal courts to deny
disclosure even where no specific FOIA exemption was available, as
the court in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. VA 8 had
claimed? Were the agencies properly applying the requirements of the
FOIA in their regulations and everyday actions? Some of the 1969
cases provoked much comment, notably Consumers Union,9 but also
Epstein v. Resor 0 and American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick." While
6. E.g., Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,39 U.S.L.W.
3360 (Feb. 23, 1971); United States v. United States Trucking Corp., 317 F. Supp. 69, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1339, 1348 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (Supp. V, 1970). For a more detailed analysis of these
exemptions, see Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-I 969, 1970 DuKE L.J. 67,
72-77 & n.3 [hereinafter cited as 1969 Project]. See also Adams, The Freedom of Information
Act and PretrialDiscovery, 43 MILITARY L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1969).
In order to facilitate references to the FOIA exemptions, the following shortened forms will
be utilized:
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1970)-"executive order"; id. § (b)(2)--personale rules";
id. § (b)(3)-"statutory exemption"; id. § (b)(4)-"trade secrets"; id. § (b)(5)-"intra- agency
memorandum"; id. § (b)(6)-"personal privacy"; id. § (b)(7)-"investigatory files"; id. §
(b)(8)-"regulatory financial data"; id. § (b)(9)-"geological data."
8. 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d
Cir. 1971).
9. See Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 1261, 1273 n.67 (1970); 1969 Project 95-98; 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 121 (1970); 45 IND. L.J. 421 (1970); 44 TUL. L. REV. 800 (1970).
10. 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970). See 1969 Project 80-81; 83 HARV. L. REv. 928 (1970). See also 116 CONG. REC.
10,156 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970); id. at 8789 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1970).
11. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Johnstone, The Freedom of Informaton[sic] Act and
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1970 was not a year in which all FOIA issues were resolved, it was
notable for the uniqueness of the problems raised and will be

remembered for the citizenry's increased awareness of governmental
activities.
Agency Rules
Since relatively few persons seek judicial action to force disclosure

of government records, the agency's own performance is more
important than what the courts and the Act prescribe." One gauge of

administrative responsiveness can be found in an agency's

regulations, and this past year saw a few important changes in agency

rules regarding information availability. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission finally revised its regulations to make

available for public inspection "interpretative" and "no-action"
letters written by the Commission staff, as well as the inquiries to
which they responded. 13 This new SEC rule is significant because it

uncovers an aspect of agency activity which had previously remained
beyond public view-interpretations of factual situations by the SEC

staff and assurances by them that no adverse Commission action
would be taken.

In another development of significance, President Nixon issued an
Executive Order" establishing a Consumer Product Information
the FDA, 25 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 296, 302 (1970); Katz, supra note 9, at 1274 n.69-70; 1969
Project 87, 92, 94.
12. 1969 Project79.
13. 35 Fed. Reg. 17779-80 (1970), amending, 17 C.F.R. § 200.80(c)(4) (1970), and adding
§ 200.81. This development was foreshadowed by Professor Davis, The Information Act: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 772-73 (1967), where disclosure of such
communications, under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V, 1970), was advocated.
The new rule exempts from disclosure "letters of comment or other communications relating
to the accuracy or adequacy of any. . . statement, report,. . . or other document filed with the
Commission ..
" 35 Fed. Reg. 17779, 17780 (1970). See BNA SECURITIES REG. & L. REP.
No. 59, A-13 (July 15, 1970). For some comments regarding the SEC rule, see id. No. 67, A-3
(Sept. 9, 1970).
The SEC has noted that "no-action and interpretative responses by the staff are subject to
reconsideration and should not be regarded as precedents binding on the Commission." 35 Fed
Reg. 17779 (1970). This would seem indeed to place them under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (Supp.
V, 1970) as "statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency,"
rather than, for example, under section 552(a)(1)(D), which includes the phrase "of general
applicability," suggesting precedential value. This point, noted by Professor Davis, supra at
773, indicates that precedential value is not determinative of public availability-but only of
whether such availability will be in the FederalRegister or in the agency reading rooms.
14. Exec. Order No. 11,566, 35 Fed. Reg. 16675 (1970).
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Coordinating Center within the General Services Administration. The
order specifically does not require the disclosure of any information
exempted by the F01A 15 and notes that much of the product
information which the government has accumulated while
endeavoring to purchase various items is not useful to consumers,
either because they are unaware of its availability or because the
information is too'fechnical to be understood by laymen. 6 Thus, the

most promising aspect of the new Center is also the most difficult to
achieve: translating the technical procurement specifications and data
of the government into information useful to the general public.

Also of interest to consumers in 1970 was the fact that the Civil
Aeronautics Board relented under pressure and authorized the

disclosure of the consumer complaint files compiled by its Bureau of
Enforcement.1 7 Furthermore, the CAB disclosed, plans to propose a
new regulation which would require that standardized complaint
statistics be maintained by air carriers to facilitate CAB and public
comparisons among various air carriers' complaint-handling
methods. 8 Despite the noticeable shift within the CAB toward freer
15. Id. at 16676.
16. The order notes that "certain product information . . . is currently available from
various government agencies but lack of awareness greatly restricts the use of such information
by the consuming public and by other government agencies." Id. at 16675. Since the order
disclaims any intent to require any greater disclosure than that required by the FOIA, one might
reasonably question the federal government's performance under the Act when previously even
other government agencies were unaware of the existence of this information.
The new Center will be assisted by advice from the President's Committee on Consumer
Interests, particularly with regard to the use of private media to assist in disseminating available
information. Id. at 16676.
17. CAB Press Release No. 70-14 (Feb. 2, 1970). See 35 Fed. Reg. 6118-21 (1970). The fight
to gain access to the CAB's consumer complaint files began in the Summer, 1969, with a request
by Mr. Reuben B. Robertson of the Center for Study of Responsive Law, Washington, D.C. On
November 25, 1969, Robertson v. Browne, Civil No. 3349-69 (D.D.C.), was filed to enjoin the
withholding of the requested files and, incidentally, to prohibit the harrassment and delay
allegedly perpetrated by CAB personnel against the Center's student researchers. On February
2, 1970, Mr. Jack Yohe, Director, Office of Information, CAB, in letter B-7 to Mr. Robertson,
announced the CAB's decision to release not only the consumer complaint files but also a 1967
Consumer Survey Report, announced in CAB Press Release No. 67-39 (Mar. 16, 1967),
conducted by the Board. See CAB Press Release No. 70-14 (Feb. 2, 1970). Subsequently, in
response to Mr. Robertson's further request, the CAB, in letter B-30 of February 10, 1970, from
Mr. Troy B. Conner, Executive Director, CAB, released for inspection and copying the letters
from the CAB to air carriers considered lacking or deficient in complaint-handling ability, and
discussing the results of the 1967 survey. On February 9, 1970, Robertson v. Browne was
dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
18. CAB Press Release No. 70-144 (Dec. 4, 1970). In other moves aimed at increasing
Board communication with air transportation users, the CAB has created a Consumers Affairs
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access to Board records-perhaps tied to personnel changes during

19701s-it did adopt a rule early in 1970 restricting the availability of
information concerning the volume of passengers, cargo, and mail
carried by air shuttle operators32°

Elsewhere in the federal government, by and large the policies of
the various agencies noted in last year's Project have not changed."

General Services Administration regulations still contain many
provisions indicative of a favorable attitude toward the FOIA.22 The

Atomic Energy Commission has expanded its definition of the trade
secrets proviso to include material concerning "control and
accounting procedures for safeguarding licensed special nuclear

material or detailed security measures for the physical protection of a
licensed facility,"

3

information arguably intended to be exempted

from disclosure by the FOIA. The Federal Trade Commission retains
its negative presumption that "[a]ll

. .

. records and information of

the Commission not clearly identifiable as public records pursuant to
. . . [FTC rules] 24 and not listed in the current index of the public

records of the Commission also constitute a part of its confidential
records ' 25 and are available to the public only upon a sworn
Office, CAB Press Release No. 70-146 (Dec. 9, 1970), and has released an updated version of its
1967 Consumer Complaint Survey, CAB Press Release No. 70-152 (Dec. 22, 1970). Since the
CAB's own consumer complaint files have been publicly available since February, 1970,
statistics regarding these files will also be made public.
19. For example, Mr. Reuben Robertson was named to head the CAB's new Consumer.
Advisory Council. Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1970, § F, at 12, col. 1.
20. 35 Fed. Reg. 3897 (1970). 14 C.F.R. Part 298 was amended, adding section 298.66. This
regulation was strongly criticized by Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) as violating the spirit of the
FOIA. 116 CONG. Rac. 2910-12 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1970).
21. 1969 Project77-79 &n.45-59.
22. 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.105-1 (1970), requires no particular interest in the subject matter of
the requested record, nor any justification for the request. Moreover, the GSA will compile
records not "in being" when it is not too burdensome to do so. Section 105-60.105-2 declares
that, even where an exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970), applies, it will not be
invoked without a "compelling reason to do so."- Section 105-60.401 provides for GSA
assistance in identifying requested documents.
In light of these regulations, it is ironic that one of last year's noteworthy FOIA decisions
was rendered against this agency. See GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), affg 289 F.
Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
23. 35 Fed. Reg. 7639-40 (1970), amending 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(a) (1970), and adding a new
paragraph ?d). Under 10 C.F.R. § 9.10 (1970), such information may still be made available if
disclosure is found to be not contrary to the public interest or does not adversely affect any
person's rights.
24. 16 C.F.R. § 4.9 (1970).
25. Id. § 4.10(c) (1970).
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statement in writing showing "good cause" for disclosure. 2 The FTC
did, however, revise certain of its regulations to provide somewhat

freer access to Commission records, including the assurances of
voluntary compliance filed with the Commission, 27 supplemental

materials filed in connection with such reports of compliance,
materials filed with the FTC concerning Commission orders requiring
divestiture of business enterprises, and the record of final votes by
2
each Commission member upon final action in all FTC proceedings. 8
The Department of Labor, the Food and Drug Administration, the
Renegotiation Board, and the Department of Agriculture's
Stabilization and Conservation Service all revised their fee schedules

for making records available to the public, 29 while the Federal
Communications Commission moved to expedite requests for records

made at hearings, by providing appeal to the Commission's Review
Board. 30 Finally, the Post Office Department has decided to provide,
26. Id. § 4.11(a), (b). This seems contrary to the intent of the FOIA to place the burden
upon the agency to sustain its nondisclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 30
infra.
27. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1970).
28. 35 Fed. Reg. 5399-400, 12061 (1970). The FTC added section 4.10(a)(8) specifically
rendering confidential the votes of Commission members concerning the issuance of complaints
or initiation of agency proceedings. Id. amending 16 C.F.R. § 4.9 (1970). This seems to
conform with the FOIA, for such votes are not truly cast in an agency proceeding, as defined by
5 U.S.C. § 551(12) (Supp. V, 1970), and referred to in id. § 552(a)(4), but prior to such
activity.
29. 35 Fed. Reg. 14771 (1970), amending 29 C.F.R. § 70.6 (1970) (Labor Dept.); 35 Fed.
Reg. 7299 (1970), amending 21 C.F.R. § 2.115 (1970) (FDA); 35 Fed. Reg. 18279 (1970),
amending 32 C.F.R. § 1480.12 (1970) (Renegotiation Board); 35 Fed. Reg. 7172 (1970),
amending 7 C.F.R. § 798.7 (1970) (Agriculture Dept., Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service). Both the Renegotiation Board and the Agriculture Department note in
their regulations that search fees will be levied even if the requested records are not found, unless
performance takes less than 15 minutes. 32 C.F.R. § 1480.12(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 18279 (1970); 7
C.F.R. § 798.7(i), 35 Fed. Reg. (1970). Copies of documents are 254 per page at the FDA, 21
C.F.R. § 2.115(b)(2), 35 Fed. Reg. 7299 (1970), while the charge is 304 per page at the Labor
Dept., 29 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 14771 (1970). By way of comparison, the
Department of Transportation charges 500 per page for photocopies of its documents. 49
C.F.R. § 7.85(b)(1) (1970).
30. 35 Fed.Reg. 8280 (1970), amending47 C.F.R. § 0.461(e)(3) (1970). While review by the
FCC Review Board might be more speedily obtained than a Commission determination, this
constitutes still another procedural step and could mean greater delay before ultimate judicial
review.
The FCC has retained its questionable rule requiring that the requesting party give his
reasons for desiring access to records which the agency claims are exempted from disclosure. 47
C.F.R. § 0.461(a) (1970). This seems contrary to the policy of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V,
1970). See note 26 supra. The FCC has another provision, 47 C.F.R. § 0A56 (1970), which
seems overbroad and contrary to the intent of the FOIA. The Commission deems entire
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without charge, the number of families or businesses served on a
3
particular route to general distribution mailers. '

One of the agency actions having particular significance for
environmental protection efforts in 1970 was the controversial
position taken by the Council on Environmental Quality (C EQ)32 that
preliminary draft environmental impact statements prepared by
federal agencies and the Council's own comments on these statements

are not for public disclosure and that the final detailed statements on
environmental impact required of all federal agencies by the National

Environmental Policy Act of 19693 need not be made public prior to
ultimate agency action. 3 4 Despite CEQ Chairman Train's
protestations to the contrary,3 it is not immediately obvious from a
reading of the National Environmental Policy Act why "draft
statements" and the comments made in response to them need

not be made public. 36 A more interesting problem arises from CEQ's
correspondence files as "not routinely available for public inspection" and forces a strict
standard of specificity in identifying these requested documents. The FOIA should reverse the
FCC's presumption, and only those documents falling within the Act's specific exemptions
should be withheld from the public. See. e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r'g Corp. v. Renegotiatior
Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. 35 Fed. Reg. 15850 (1970), amending 39 C.F.R. § 123A(c)(4) (1970).
32. The Council on Environmental Quality was established by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 43424347 (Supp. March, 1970).
33. Id.
34. Letter from Russell E. Train, Chairman, CEQ, to Senator Henry Jackson, Nov. 19,
1970, reprinted in I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 802-04 (1970). For
remarks on the letter see id. at 781-82. See note 40 infra.
42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c) (Supp. March, 1970), requires that a detailed environmental
impact statement be prepared for every legislative proposal or major action affecting the
environment contemplated by federal agencies. It further provides that:
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statements
and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which
are authorized to develop and enforce environmentalstandards, shall be made available
. . .to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5,. . .Id. (emphasis added).
The President issued Exec. Order No., 11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), which ordered agency
heads to proceed with compliance with this section of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. Subsequently, the CEQ issued interim guidelines concerning environmental impact
statements. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390-93 (1970).
35. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 802 (1970).
36. To its credit, the Department of the Interior recently decided to make its preliminary
draft environmental statement concerning the proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline available to the
public prior to the commencement of that project. Dept. of the Interior Press Release No.
30545-70 (Jan. 13, 1971); id. No. 31416-71 (Feb. 16, 1971) (noting absence of a requirement that
such draft statements be made public).
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refusal to disclose its own comments upon environmental impact
statements. The crucial issue is whether CEQ qualifies as a federal
agency "authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, ' 3 7 because then its comments would be required to be
made public by the Policy Act. That Act and Executive Order 11514 3

arguably lead to the conclusion that C EQ does so qualify, although it
is interesting to note the lack of "mandatory" language in the

Council's interim guidelines concerning the environmental impact

statements,39 arguably casting some doubt on CEQ's authority.
Moreover, if CEQ's comments on final detailed envirorimental
impact statements should be made available to the public, it hardly
seems in conformity with the intent of the National Environmental

Policy Act or the Executive Order to allow the Council to avoid such
disclosure by creating a new category of non-public records called
preliminary "draft statements" and making its comments on these.40
Executive Order Exemption
In Soucie v. Dubridge4 t a suit filed by conservation groups seeking
disclosure of a report prepared for the President by the Office of
Science and Technology (OST) was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.12 In its brief decision, the district court asserted that
adjudication of the matter would be an "exercise in futility" and held
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c) (Supp. March, 1970). See note 34 supra.
38. 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).
39. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390-93 (1970).
40. The CEQ has now reversed itself and in its recently-announced "Guidelines"
recommends public availability of both preliminary "draft environmental statements" and final
"detailed environmental statements" prior to any agency action significantly affecting the
environment. 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, 1399-400 (1971). See 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRBNT
DEVELOPMENTS 1034-35, 1054-58 (1971). CEQ also clarified the relationship of the FOIA's
exemption for intra-agency memorandums with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
by declaring that agency comments on both draft and final environmental statements are not
protected from disclosure by the FOIA. 36 Fed. Reg. at 1400. While no mention was made
regarding disclosure of CEQ's own comments, there is a suggestion in another section of the
Guidelines that CEQ might consider itself not susceptible to the FOIA on a theory of
Presidential "executive privilege" similar to that claimed by the Office of Science &Technology
in Soucie v. Dubridge, 27 AD.L.2d 379 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1970). See 36 Fed. Reg. at 1399. For
a discussion of Soucie v. Dubridgesee text accompanying notes 41-54 infra.
41. 27 AD. L.2D 379 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1970), appealdocketed sub nom., Soucie v. David,
No. 24,573 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 1970), argued Dec. 7, 1970, rev'd andren'd, April 13, 1971.
42. See generally I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-FEDERAL LAWS 51:2001 (1970). The report
allegedly criticized the proposed Supersonic Transport program for environmental and
economic reasons. See 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 305-06, 468-69
(1970).
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that the FOIA does not apply to the President because Congress could
not "dictate the extent of executive privilege" a President could
assert.4 3 The court further held that the OST is not an agency 4 within
the Office of the President but is part of the executive branch of the
government, much as the Office of Counsel or Office of
Appointments. The basis for this decision is vague, not only because
no authority is cited by the court, but also because the court added
that Congress had put applicable exemptions in the FOIA. This seems
to contradict a previous assertion by the district court that the FOIA
does not apply to the OST. Moreover, it is difficult to speculate which
of the Act's exemptions the court might have thought relevant, since
the contention that the report qualified under the "intra-agency
memorandum" exemption was specifically rejected. Only the
"executive order" exemption seems to be applicable, but this section
was not mentioned by the court, and, in any event, there was no
specific executive order which had required that the report be kept
4
classified. 1
Two other issues are raised by Soucie v. Dubridge: whether the
Office of Science and Technology is an "agency" and thus susceptible
to the FOIA and whether, despite the FOIA, the President personally
may refuse to disclose records, relying on his executive privilege. The
answer to the second question appears to be yes, principally because
courts and some commentators seem to accept this as a constitutional
proposition. 4 However, the FOIA's exemption for national defense or
foreign policy secrets47 is seemingly broad enough to cover the socalled constitutional executive privilege, which is grounded on the
43. 27 AD. L.2D at 379.

44. The FOIA requires that each "agency" make information available. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(Supp. V, 1970). The APA provides the definition of "agency" to be "each authority of the

Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency," but excluding, inter alia, Congress, federal courts, U.S. territorial and possession

governments, and the District of Columbia government. Id. § 551.
45. See GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1969).
46. Professor Davis expressed relief at the "fortunate [fact]. . .that executive privilege can
override the [FOIl Act.
...
Davis, supra note 13, at 811. He relied on general constitutional
principles, as well as on United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953). Davis, supra, at 763-65.

But the Court in Reynolds did not attempt to reach any broad constitutional principles, 345
U.S. at 6, settling for the proposition that the privilege must first be asserted by the government,

and the judiciary's role is to determine whether the circumstances warrant non-disclosure. And
this 1952 decision, under the old FOIA of 1946, § 3, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), coming in the

midst of Korean War preparations, involved military secrets, which would now be clearly
exempted from disclosure by section 552(b)(1).

47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. V,1970).
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separation of powers doctrine."' Just what the President personally
may refuse to make public is an unresolved question. 9 Agencies,
however, even those within the executive department, are more clearly
within the Act's dictates, despite their attempts to rely on an assertion
of presidential executive privilegeA ° The crucial issue in Soucie is
whether the OST is an "agency" or is to be considered, in effect, as
the President himself.5 1 The Attorney General's Memorandum5 2 on
the FOIA interprets the Act to "apply to every department, board,
commission, division, or other organizational unit in the executive
branch.5 3 The Office of Science and Technology arguably is within
this category, suggesting that the court's grant of a dismissal in
Soucie was erroneous. If the OST is indeed an "agency" as defined by
the Administrative Procedure Act there is no reason why Mr.
Dubridge couldn't have been enjoined from withholding the requested
report, in the same manner that other government officials are so
enjoined. Soucie v. Dubridge only adds to the confusion over the
obligations of the President and executive branch offices under the
FOIA.5

Statutory Exemption
One of the questions raised in 1969 by the court in Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. VA 55 concerned the interpretation of a
statute which regulates the disclosure of confidential information by
public officials5" and its relation to the FOIA.57 One particular section
of the statute in issue, section 1905,5s prohibits government employees
48. See 44

WASH.

L. REv. 641, 650-55 (1969).

49. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy:An Unresolved ConstitutionalQuestion,

66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
50. See, e.g., 44 WASH. L. REV., supra note 48, at 650-55.
51. Dr. DuBridge, the Director of OST, contended that he retained the report solely as "a
custodian of the President's records." Affidavit of Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, July 22, 1970, 4,
reprintedin Brief for Appellants at Appendix 14, Soucie v. David, No. 24,573 (D.C. Cir., filed
Aug. 24, 1970). See note 44 supra.
52. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967), reprintedat 20 AD. L.
REV. 263 (1968).

53. Id. at 270-71.
54. Subsequent to the preparation of this article the District of Columbia Circuit, in a
sweeping and significant decision, reversed and remanded the district court determination in
Soucie v. David, No. 24, 573 (D.C. Cir. April 13, 1971).
55. 301 F. Supp. 796, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1904-08 (1964).
57. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (Supp. V,1970).
58. Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States ... makes known in any
manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the
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from divulging trade secrets coming to them in the course of their
employment, except as authorized by law. The Consumers Union

court had raised the possibility of a circular issue because section 1905
prohibits disclosure unless otherwise authorized, and the FOIA
requires disclosure unless specifically exempted. 9 However, the
Consumers Union court was not called upon to resolve this potential
difficulty."0

The District of Columbia Circuit, however, confronted this
question in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation v.
Renegotiation Board,6 where an aerospace contractor sought
disclosure of Board orders and opinions issued during the 1962-1965
renegotiations of the contracts of 14 other companies and also records

relating to its own 1965 contract renegotiations. The Grumman court
determined that section 1905 merely provided a criminal penalty for

unauthorized disclosure of certain confidential information and did
not of itself establish a separate category of protected records, since
the FOIA's "trade secrets" exemption"2 already protected such

information from disclosure.63 Noting the FOIA's requirement for
narrow construction of its exemptions," the court held that section
1905 did not expand the trade secrets exemption already provided by
the FOIA. Essentially, the Grumman case avoided a circular issue by

giving predominance to the presumed FOIA policy of favoring
disclosure of government records' 5 and by reading section 1905 as not

constituting a statutory exemption under the FOIA.11
course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or

investigation-.

.

which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets [or]

confidential statistical data

. . .

of any person

. . .

shall be fined not more than $1,000,

or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or
employment. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964).
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(3), 552(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
60. The court in Consumers Union held that the records sought were not trade secrets; thus,
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964), did not apply. 301 F. Supp. at 802 n.20. The court also mentioned that
the Veterans Administration had cited to the lower court litigation in Grumman to support its
reliance on section 1905, but since the district court had filed no opinion in that case, this
attempted precedent was cast aside by the Consumers Union court. 301 F. Supp. at 802.
61. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1970).
63. 425 F.2d at 580 n.5.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
65. See. e.g., id. § 552(a)(3) ("[tihe burden is on the agency to sustain its action [of nondisclosure]").
66. The regulations of at least two agencies still rely on 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964), as
delineating a separate class of statutorily exempted records. See 41 C.F.R. § 105-.60.604(b)(1)
(1970) (GSA); 47 C.F.R. § 0.457(d) (1970) (FCC).
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Trade Secrets Exemption
The exemption for "trade secrets and commercial or financial
'6 7
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential
was considered in several decisions of interest during 1970. In
Grumman part of the requested records relating to Grumman's own
contract renegotiations during 1965 included correspondence between
the Board and Grumman's prime contractor, which the government
asserted was exempted from disclosure, inter alia, as confidential
trade secrets. The court of appeals held, as to these documents, that
the test for availability was "whether they contain commercial or
financial information which the contractor would not reveal to the
public.""8 This suggests an objective test to be applied by judges,
regardless of whether or not the information was submitted on the
express or implied condition that it be kept confidential. If this is a
proper interpretation of the court's directive in Grumman, it
apparently is a departure from the previously assumed test for
confidentiality: whether the materials were submitted or accepted on
the premise they would be kept secret. 9
In another decision, the district court in Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC 0 assumed that the wishes of the submitter of information would
govern, 7 but the District of Columbia Circuit, in remanding the
action for more particular adjudication on each exemption, suggested
that the bare claim by an agency that records are within the "trade
secrets" exemption is not determinative.7 2 Relying on Grumman, the
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1970).
68. 425 F.2d at 582.
69. See Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968). There, the district court
interpreted the "trade secrets" exemption as protecting information that a person wants
protected which the government receives after an express or implied promise to preserve secrecy.
Id. at 594. This language, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969),
requires only an assertion that the submitter wanted confidentiality and the government
promised it-no inquiry into whether the information really merits exemption seems required.
See also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 34.
The objective test for confidentiality under the "trade secrets" exemption would preclude
arbitrariness on the part of agency officials while protecting secrets supplied to the government
in good faith by private parties. See Katz, supra note 9, at 1267-70. For a recent survey of the
trade secrets area, see Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software. 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv.
909, 926-44 (1970). See also E. Gellhorn, Business Secrets in Administrative Agency
Adjudication, 22 AD. L. Rav. 515 (1970).
70. 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd in part and remanded, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
71. 284 F. Supp. at 747.
72. 424 F.2d 938.
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court of appeals in Bristol-Myers concluded that the lower court
would have to consider carefully whether a claimed exemption is

proper. 73 While not expressly disapproving of the district court's test,
the court of appeals referred only to the Grumman decision,

suggesting that it was also adopting an objective standard for
confidential information. The Grumman decision is noteworthy for

another point in the "trade secrets" exemption area; the court agreed
with earlier judicial interpretations 4 and held that the exemption
applied only to information which did not originate within the
75

government.
The FCC had occasion to consider the trade secrets privilege in In
re Request by KOWL, Inc.,76 where KOWL was denied access to
financial forms filed by an applicant for a competing broadcasting

license. The records consisted of annual financial reports which were

77
submitted in confidence and allegedly contained trade secrets.

According to Commission regulations, these records are not routinely
available for public inspection 7 and a party seeking access to them
must establish a "pursuasive showing" of need. 79 While these records
seem easily within the bounds of the FOIA's "trade secrets"

exemption, the matter is complicated by the fact that prior to this
decision the FCC had granted a license to the competing applicant, s°
relying in part upon the financial statements which were requested. 8'
73. Id.
74. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796,803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir.
1969).
75. 425 F.2d at 582. Grumman had sought access to "inter-departmental and inter-agency
communications between the Board and other government agencies with respect to Grumman's
performance on its renegotiable contracts." Id. at 581. Apparently the court assumed that these
records did not qualify under the "intra-agency memorandum" exemption because in an earlier
decision, Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1960), it had ruled
similar of the Renegotiation Board's records discoverable under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
76. 20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 102 (1970).

77. Id. at 103.
78. 47 C.F.R. § 0.457(d)(1)O) (1970).
79. 20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 102, 103 (1970); see 47 C.F.R. § 0A61 (1970).
80. In re Application of Emerald Broadcasting Co., (KTHO), 19 P & F RADIO REc. 2D 149
(1970).
81. Id. at 152. At one point in its opinion, the FCC criticized KOWL, which was objecting
to the KTHO license application, for failing to present "the type of specific data required" to
support its economic allegations. Id. at 151.
The importance of the FCC's previous reliance on records in issuing orders or opinions will
be more fully discussed below. See pp. 188-89 infra. Some courts have held the exemption to be
unavailable, even for records clearly within its scope, when the agency used the records in a way
indicating that secrecy was neither necessary nor equitable. See American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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KOWL, in its letter of request, asserted that a court appeal was
contemplated and that access to the records relied upon by the FCC
was necessary to make adequate preparations. 82 In his denial, the
FCC Executive Director called Commission reliance on the anhual
financial reports "minimal"' and again chided KOWL for failing to
come forward with specific allegations with respect to the financial
forms,8 4 despite the obvious fact that KOWL had never been
permitted to examine them. The Executive Director listed two
examples where annual financial reports had been released by the
Commission.8 In one of those decisions, In re Request by Cape Cod
Broadcasting,Inc.-,8 the Director himself had alluded to the value of
the records, when he refused to substitute the sworn assurances of
accuracy by a submitter of the reports for the actual disclosure of the
financial information, declaring that "[the annual financial reports]
may prove helpful to [petitioners] beyond the figures selected and
relied upon by its adversary." 87 Even accepting the fact, arguendo,
that the financial forms were indeed trade secrets within the FOIA
exemption and that FCC reliance on them earlier had been minimal, it
appears that the "balancing of interests" standard required by FCC
regulations' was incorrectly applied.
Intra-Agency Memorandum Exemption
The "intra-agency memorandum" exemption 9 did not receive as
frequent consideration in 1970 as it had in past years; the judicial
decisions mostly reiterated and clarified principles announced during
1969. In Bristol-Myers Co.9 0 the court presented some guidelines to
assist the district court in handling that case upon remand. The need
to protect the free exchange of ideas within government agencies was
recognized, but the court cautioned that "[p]urely factual reports and
scientific studies" 9 1 could not be hidden from public scrutiny by
characterizing them as internal memorandums. Moreover, the court
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 103.
Id.
at 105.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103-04.
19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 135 (1970).
Id. at 136.
47 C.F.R. § 0.461(c)(4) (1970).

89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (Supp. V, 1970).
90. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

91. Id. at 939; accord, GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1969); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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of appeals affirmed the notion presented in American Mail Line, Ltd.
v.. Gulick9 2 that an internal document may lose its protected status if
publicly utilized by an agency as the sole basis for its action."
Unfortunately, the Bristol-Myers court did not mention an interesting
aspect of the FTC action involved in the case: that it was a proposed
rule making rather than a final decision. It is impossible to know
whether the court would consider this kind of agency action sufficient
to alter the status of a formerly protected memorandum.94
A ckerly v. Ley95 has become a much-cited opinion in the year since
it was rendered. The litigation was precipitated by an FDA proposal
to ban carbon tetrachloride from interstate commerce. 96 An attorney
representing household chemical manufacturers asked to examine
various reports and memorandums compiled by the FDA in its
investigation of the uses of "carbon tet." The FDA's decision to
refuse this request was upheld by the district court.97 In vacating and
remanding that court's ruling, the court of appeals in A ckerly, as did
the Bristol-Myers court, attempted to suggest the framework within
which the district court should operate in arriving at a new decision.
The District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the legitimate
purpose behind protecting the reasoning processes of government
agencies from the inhibiting pressures of public revelation9 8 but
warned of "the inevitable temptation of a government litigant" to
conceal more than necessary to preserve its free interchange of ideas. 9
One of the more unusual 1970 FOIA cases was the FCC decision
in In re Request of Reuben B. Robertson & Ronald L. Winkler,t t
92. 411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
93. 424 F.2d at 939. The plaintiff in Bristol-Myers was seeking disclosure of certain
materials 'eferred to in a "Notice of Trade Regulation Proposed Rulemaking Proceeding," 32

Fed. Reg. 9843 (1967), where the FTC had noted: "In taking this action the Commission has
considered, among other things, the results of an extensive staff investigation of advertising

representations for nonprescription systemic analgesic drugs .
and available studies and reports ....

its accumulated experience

"

94'. The court of appeals did not live up to one commentator's prediction that the BristolMyers adjudication would clarify the FOIA's requirements concerning advance disclosure of
materials underlying proposed agency regulatory actions. Johnstone, supra note 11, at 304.
95. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
96. 33 Fed. Reg. 3076 (1968). For a history of FDA actions in this matter, see 35 Fed, Reg.

4001 (1970).
97. Ackerly v. Goddard, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] F.D. CosM. L. REP.
(D.D.C. 1968).
98. 420 F.2d at 1340-41.
99. Id. at 1341.
100. 20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 377 (1970).

40,338
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wherein an intra-agency document was released to the public despite
its classification. The document requested was a memorandum
written by the FCC General Counsel for the use of the Commissioners

and contained an analysis and discussion of a recent Supreme Court
decision.' 01 Clearly, such a document is normally exempted from
disclosure by the "intra-agency memorandum" exemption. However,
the FCC chose to permit disclosure of this memorandum because it
had been "leaked" to 'a trade publication and had received

widespread circulation

within the industry itself.10 2 The

Commissioners emphasized that their action was limited to the special

facts confronted and that, in the future, the mere circumstance that an
intra-agency memorandum had been leaked would not serve to justify
an automatic release of the document to the general public. 103 In re
Robertson is interesting for its frank discussion of a problem not
unique to the FCC: "leaks" of federal agency documents to the

regulated industry. The FCC condemned this "insidious practice,"'0 4
yet has been singularly unable or unwilling to prevent it. 0 1 The

inequity in this situation is glaringly obvious, since the general public
is typically without a similar "pipeline" to agency documents and is

placed at a comparative disadvantage with the regulated industry in
agency proceedings.'0 When an agency has not treated a document as
confidential, there is no reason to afford it the privilege from
disclosure authorized by the FOIA. Whatever inhibiting effect the
disclosure may initially have had, a further release to the general
public would not seem to cause any significant additional inhibiting
07
pressure and would certainly be the equitable action to take.
101. The case discussed was Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
102. 20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 378. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 15, 1969, at 34, carried
an article entitled: "A Legal Go-ahead for FCC program controls? General Counsel Geller says
broadcasters are subject to spectrum of program obligations because of Red Lion case."
103. 20 P & F RADM REG. 2D at 378.
104. Id.
105. The petition listed two other examples of "leaks" of FCC information to Broadcasting
Magazine. Application for Review of Refusal by FCC Executive Director to Permit Public
Inspection & Copying of Commission Records, 8-9 (Aug. 13, 1970). The Red Lion
Memorandum itself had been marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," according to FCC
General Counsel Henry Geller, Affidavit of Ronald L. Winkler at 2 (Aug. 12, 1970), placing it
under the requirements of 47 C.F.R. § 0.451(b)(4) (1970), which prohibits the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential Commission documents.
106. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, in his concurring opinion, observed that a leak
"weights the scales of procedural fairness even more heavily against the public." 21 P & F
RADio REG. 2D at 379-80..
107. The FCC argued that "the degree of restraint and inhibition would very probably
multiply if the fact of a leak became the criterion for determining the continued confidentiality
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PersonalPrivacy Exemption
In Ackerly v. Ley' °s the FDA had already released certain medical

records concerning a death, purportedly caused by the inhalation of a
chemical substance which the FDA had proposed to restrict. While
holding the case moot as to these reports," 9 the court, in dictum,
noted that the FDA had declared that permission was received from
its sources to release the medical information. However, the court
indicated that a mere "pledge of confidentiality" would not preclude
the effectiveness of the FOIA and that it was for a court to decide
whether the "personal privacy" exemption had been properly
invoked.110 This suggests that an objective test"' is to be applied by the
courts, a conclusion consonant with the Act's requirement that a
potential invasion of privacy be "clearly unwarranted.""' Obviously,
the individual whose files are involved, or even the agency retaining
the information, will not have the same impartiality that a court
would have in deciding whether there is sufficient justification to
release medical or personnel records.
Investigatory Files Exemption
In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC"3 the court of appeals interpreted the

"investigatory files" exemption to require that enforcement
proceedings be "imminent" for files to remain classified under this
section of the FOIA and remanded to the district court for the inquiry
into the realistic prospects for such agency action."' The exemption
was said to be intended to restrict parties to agency regulatory action
to the same scope of discovery allowed persons charged with
of intra-agency memoranda." Id. at 378. Commissioner Johnson responded by saying: "It is
not easy to envision an instance of a release substantially impairing agency operations. And even
in cases where some harm is possible, that harm would no doubt be outweighed by the
procedural unfairness to members of the public." Id. at 380.
108. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

109. Id. at 1340.
110. Id. at 1339-40 n.3.

111. While it is not entirely clear because the issue was not ruled upon, the court of appeals
in Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), seems to have assumed that

the standard under the "personal privacy" exemption would have been an objective one, since it
apparently reserved for itself the right to determine the extent of any possible invasion of privacy

and apparently accepted agency discretion to release information regardless of whether the
individual involved consented to disclosure. Id. at 158. Cf.text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (Supp. V, 1970).
113. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114. Id. at 939.
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violations of federal criminal law."' Moreover, the court suggested
that some of the documents within a particular file may be
discoverable, since the agency was not permitted to render noninvestigatory materials secret by placing them in investigatory files.",
In Weliford v. Hardin17 the district court was asked to require the
Secretary of Agriculture to produce warning letters sent to nonfederally inspected meat and poultry producers suspected of engaging
in interstate commerce, as well as information concerning the
detention of meat and poultry products."' While mentioning the
paucity of authority in this area, the court relied heavily upon BristolMyers in ordering disclosure."' Of prime importance was the fact that
those parties potentially the target of enforcement proceedings were
already fully aware of the contents of the documents requested. This,
the court reasoned, was clearly a different situation from that which
the FOIA's "investigatory files" exemption was meant to prevent:
"premature discovery by a defendant in an enforcement
proceeding."' 120 Therefore, the court held that "[d]isclosure of
material already in the hands of potential parties to law enforcement
proceedings can in no way be said to interfere with the agency's
legitimate law-enforcement functions."' 2' The importance of this
decision can hardly be overemphasized. While Bristol-Myers had
declared that investigatory files may lose their protection from public
disclosure if proceedings are not pending or reasonably anticipated,
Wellford v. Hardin would require that, even where the enforcement is
ongoing, records may become unprotected by the "investigatory
files" exemption if parties to agency regulatory action have access to
the documents.
The significance of this ruling can be seen by the example of the
FAA's Public Enforcement Docket. As of August, 1970, all that was
115. Id., citing Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D.P.R. 1967);
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
116. 424 F.2d at 939.
117. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), Mr. Wellford is the Director, Center for Study of
Responsive Law.
118. Id. at 176. Also requested were certain other related records, but they were claimed to
be exempted as "intra-agency memoranda," and the district court postponed decision as to
them pending an in camera review.
119. Id. at 177.
120. Id. at 178. The court distinguished Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp.
591 (D.P.R. 1967). In that case, the person requesting copies of the statements of witnesses to
the NLRB was a party to the proceeding-an employer who had apending unfair labor practice
charge against him.
121. 315 F. Supp. at 178.
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available for public inspection was a brief record of finalized civil
penalty and certificate actions. 22 Not included were any letters from
the alleged violator, nor any interim correspondence sent by the FAA

to him. And, most importantly, the Public Enforcement Docket
contained no letters of warning, nor any other enforcement documents
which did not result in a civil penalty or a certificate action. This
"subliminal activity" of the FAA may be crucial to an understanding
of that agency; it may be as important to know where penalties were

not assessed as it is to know where they were assessed.'2 Under the
WelIford v. Hardindecision these materials should be made available

for public inspection, at least to the extent alleged violators have
knowledge of their contents.
A second Wellford v. Hardin2 1 case and two agency decisions
oppose this position. In this second court case involving Mr.
Wellford, he had requested access to records maintained by the
Department of Agriculture's Pesticides Regulation Division. The
district court, while requiring disclosure of the requested index cards,

authorized the deletion of information regarding "citations, seizures
or recall" actions's under the Federal Insecticides, Fungicides and

Rodenticides Act, 1 2 6 of products of manufacturers engaged in
interstate commerce.

127

These records are exactly the kind of

information already in the hands of potential parties to enforcement
proceedings that the first Wellford v. Hardin decision had declared
28
should be available for public inspection.
122. The available materials included a chronological listing by name of offender and date
the action was closed, of all completed civil penalties and certificate actions assessed, and, for
each violation, one letter to the alleged offender which briefly announced the violation, and a
second letter closing the matter or referring it to the Justice Department.
123. Indeed, the FAA has prepared for its own use A Status History Report of Air Carrier
Violations compiled by the Flight Standards Division, and Air CarrierEnforcement Cases,
compiled by the General Counsel's Office, which keep track of violation notices and warnings
sent by FAA inspectors.
124. 315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).
125. Id. at 769.
126. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135K (1964).
127. 315 F. Supp. at 770. The court agreed with Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that merely because some part of a file or
card is exempt from disclosure does not mean the entire file or card may be withheld. 315 F.
Supp. at 769-70.
128. Certainly a manufacturer would be notified of any citations against it or any seizures or
recalls of its products. The revelation to the public of agency records containing such
information would conform to the FOIA's requirements, since, even under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(Supp. V, 1970), a party to a law enforcement proceeding would have to be informed of any
complaint against him.
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The FTC, in a letter ruling,'2 took a similar position in denying
the request of a student group to examine the correspondence between
the Commission and the proposed respondents to an unfair practices
consent order. While granting the students' requests to examine other
information collected in the FTC's investigatory file,13 the
Commission maintained that the correspondence was part of its
confidential "investigational files." 3 1 Ironically, the letter ruling ends
with the assertion that the students had been allowed to examine the
investigatory file to the same or greater extent than might be allowed
to a respondent in litigation with the Commission, yet any
respondents who had corresponded with the Commission would
naturally have had access to such correspondence as was denied the
students.
The FCC in In re Request by Evening Star32 upheld the initial
denial of a request by a Washington, D.C., newspaper to examine the
violation notices sent by the FCC to certain amateur radio stations in
connection with anti-Vietnam war activities. The Executive Director
had decided that disclosure would be "unfairly damaging to the
stations and prejudicial to the conduct of any further investigations or
enforcement proceedings that may be necessary."' No support was
given for this allegation. Clearly, if the congressional intent in
enacting the "investigatory files" exemption to the FOIA, was to
prevent defendants in enforcement proceedings from prematurely
discovering agency records,3 4 the Executive Director's rationale
would be irrelevant where the potential defendants had already
received copies of the records being requested. The first Wellford v.
129. Letter (Ruling) from Mr. Joseph W. Shea, Secretary, FTC, to Mr. Aaron Handleman,
Feb. 24, 1970, re: Campbell Soup Co., FTC File No. 692 3061. The students, calling themselves
Students Opposing Unfair Practices (SOUP), became interested in a proposed consent order
which the FTC planned to issue regarding certain alleged unfair advertising by the Campbell
Soup Company. See Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
18,706 (FTC 1969); id. 18,897, 19,006, 19,261 (FTC 1970). For a summary of the FTC action
regarding the "SOUP" involvement, see BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 451, A-16
(Mar. 3, 1970).
130. Letter (Ruling), supra note 129, at 2 (including copies of television, newspaper and
magazine advertisements employing the deception charged in the FTC complaint, which, of
course, were already exhibited to the public).
131. Letter (Ruling), supra note 129, at 3. The Commission also declared that the
correspondence would not be helpful to the students-an allegation which is irrelevant to the
threshold question of whether the "investigatory files" exemption is applicable.
132. 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 972 (1970).
133. Id. at 973.
134. See Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md. 1970).
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Hardin court recognized that there might be valid policy reasons for
extending the scope of the "investigatory files" exemption to other
situations 'but declared that such a change was for Congress to
enact. 35 The FCC proceeded to allow disclosure of the violation
notices, treating the Evening Star's petition for review as a new
request, because the Commission had ended its investigations and
contemplated no further action against the amateurs. 136 Yet,
seemingly ignoring the Bristol-Myers holding that the "investigatory
files" exemption is unavailable where enforcement proceedings are
not imminent, 37 the FCC persisted in requiring a showing of "good
cause" to justify release of the requested violation notices, on the
grounds that its rules concerning the release of confidential records
were still applicable.'u
Identifiable Records
The requirement of the FOIA that a request must be for
"identifiable records"'' 3 spawned much litigation in 1970 and poses
problems which will no doubt trouble the courts in the future. In the
first Wellford v. Hardin'4" case the Agriculture Department had
asserted that the requested records regarding detentions of meat
products were not identifiable because "such information is dispersed
in many individual files, some of which are in storage. Assembling
this information would require the search of many files and be
extremely burdensome."'' The district court had no trouble rejecting
this argument, holding it irrelevant to identifiability that the gathering
of the records might be an arduous task, since an agency could make
appropriate charges for any effort expended. Because the Agriculture
Department clearly knew what information was being sought, the
records had been sufficiently identified.'
135. Id.

136. 19 P & F RADIO

REG. 2D at 973.
137. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
138. 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2 D at 973.

139. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
140. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970).
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id. The Department of Agriculture had relied on Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), but the district court distinguished that case. Tuchinsky's reference to

the -"identifiability issue" was not only dictum but also was concerned with a non-contested
matter. The Seventh Circuit had noted that the Selective Service System's affidavits alleging

that the requested records were not identifiable, had not been denied by the plaintiff. Id. at 157.
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A similar rationale was followed in Bristol-Myers v. FTC' where
the request was for the documents alluded to by the FTC in its notice
proposing a new rule concerning advertising practices.' 44 Declaring
that the necessity of asking for "identifiable records" was not meant
to be a barrier to disclosure of agency materials, the court held that,
since the FTC knew which records it had used in formulating the
proposed rule, it could not complain of insufficient identification.'
The court used a "reasonable description" test for deciding whether
enough information had been given to locate the requested records.' 4 7
The FCC in In re National Cable Television Association, Inc.
took a more stringent view of the FOIA's requirements and refused to
grant a request to examine the documents used to determine certain
cost factors discussed in an FCC notice' of proposed application
filing fees.' The FCC's Federal Register notice, unlike the FDA
announcement discussed above, 50 did not refer specifically to any
documents relied upon, yet, in the Executive Director's letter of denial
he asserted that "Ly]our blanket request must be denied because it
cannot be identified and assembled without totally unreasonable
expenditures of Commission manpower."'' Furthermore, it seems
that the FCC confused the exemptions of the FOIA with the
requirement of "identifiable records." And under Bristol-Myers and
the first Wellford v. Hardin decisions, the difficulty in assembling
records must be compensated for by reasonable fees but may not serve
to deny access to agency materials.
In the second Wellford v. Hardin52 decision, the district court held
143. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
144. 32 Fed. Reg. 9843 (1967).
145. 424 F.2d at 938. In so holding, the court of appeals reversed the district court, which
had interpreted the "identifiable records" requirement to mean that the records are so
specifically identified that only the ministerial action of some subordinate "would be necessary
to lift them from their files," without the exercise of any judgment to determine what was within
the requested category. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D.D.C. 1968). In a
similar situation where an FDA notice of proposed rule making alluded to "information
gathered from investigations and other sources," 33 Fed. Reg. 3076 (1968), the FDA made no
claim that a request for these materials was not for identifiable records. See Ackerly v. Ley, 420
F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
146. 424 F.2d at 938.
147. 18 P & F RADIO RAG. 2D 985 (1970).
148. The initial notice of proposed application filing fee schedules was in 35 Fed. Reg. 3815
(1970), and a supplemental notice appeared in id. at 4307.
149. 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 987.
150. See note 145 supra for a discussion of the FDA notice.
151. 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 987.
152. 315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).
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it a violation of the FOIA for the Pesticides Regulation Division
(PRD) of the Department of Agriculture to withhold the sole means
for requesting an "identifiable record."'' In a bizarre attempt at
secrecy, the PRD refused to release any documents not specifically
identified by its assigned file number. To learn the file number,
however, one had to see the master record card index, which the PRD
refused to make available to the public. Therefore, it was impossible
to learn the appropriate file number, and it was consequently
impossible to satisfy the PRD's demand that records be identified by
number. The court took little time in declaring such a set-up to be
illegal and required the PRD to permit partial inspection of its master
file cards.'"
Two issues arose in 1970 which may present new problems for
those seeking information from government agencies. The first
problem involves where a request for records must be tendered. The
FCC in In re National Cable Television Association, Inc.' refused to
release certain reports and working papers used in filling out a Bureau
of the Budget' 56 form. 5 7 Since the form was completed at the direction
of the Bureau of the Budget, the FCC felt that any request for what it
5
termed an "inter-agency report" should be directed to that agency.'
The FOIA does not deal expressly with the question of whether
records are the property of one agency or another. The Attorney
General's Memorandum on the Act expresses the opinion that
requests should be directed "to the agency whose interest in the record
is paramount" but also makes clear that procedural obstacles should
not be erected by virtue of "these essentially internal Government
problems" of which agency's records are being requested.' The
Grumman Aircraft " decision mentioned that records which are
confidential in one agency's hands retain their protection when given
to another agency.' 6' Unless that court contemplated the possibility of
requesting the records from this second agency, the statement would
be superfluous, since no protection would be needed for the records
153. Id. at 770.
154. Id.
155. 18 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 985 (1970).
156. Now tl Office of Management and Budget.
157. Id. at 987, relying on 47 C.F.R. § 0.451 (b)(3) (1970).
158. 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 986-87.
159. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 24.
160: 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
161. Id. at 582.
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unless they could be requested at the agency which had not initially
acquired or originated them. There seems to be no reason why an
agency submitting information to another agency cannot decide on its
own initiative to release a copy of what it has originated and
conveyed.
A second issue arising in 1970 concerned the fees to be charged for
making records available. Only one case dealt with this matter,
Reinoehl v. Hershey, 6 2 and there the court held that the fees charged
by the Selective Service System for copying a registrant's file-$1.00
per page or $5.00 per hour for an agency employee to monitor while
the registrant himself copies the file-were not unreasonable under the
FOIA, since other means to secure the information were available.' n
The more difficult problem would arise when an agency has records in
storage' or in such a state of disorganization that the difficulty in
locating them is greatly magnified.1 5 Certainly an agency should not
be allowed, consistent with the intent of the FOIA, to price
information accessibility effectively out of reach of the public.'6 6
Opinions and Orders-Reliance
To increase the opportunity for citizen awareness of agency
activity, the FOIA requires that "final opinions, including concurring
and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in adjudication of
cases"' 67 be available for public inspection. In Grumman Aircraft6
this section was utilized to require the Renegotiation Board to make
available certain of its orders and opinions for a three-year period
despite objections that they contained exempted trade secrets. The
court held that the legislative history of the FOIA 65 did not authorize
162. 426 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1970).
163. Id.
164. See Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 177 (D. Md. 1970).
165. A parallel problem exists when an agency is so derelict as to not compile, even for its
own use, statistics and reports which it should normally be expected to prepare. See Tuchinsky v.
Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), where the court, in quite an understatement,
declares it "difficult to understand" how the Selective Service System could keep no
"'identifiable records' of personal data about board personnel." Id. at 157. See also Nader,
Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LUB. L. REv.
1, 12 (1970) (CAB's failure to compile records).
166. See, e.g., notes 29 supra, 216 infra.

167. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970).
168. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
169. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1966).
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concealment of an entire document "merely because it contained
some confidential information."'" 0 Yet, the court also declared that if

Renegotiation Board orders or opinions contained any material
exempted under the "trade secrets" exemption, such material would

be protected by suitable deletions of identifying details.'
Surprisingly, the court neglected specifically to permit deletion of
materials under the "trade secrets" exemption itself. Unless the

District of Columbia Circuit was assuming that "identifying details"
included useful trade secrets, or that the trade secrets here were useless

without identification, its statement apparently renders the FOIA's
exemptions inapplicable where the Act requires certain specified
records to be made available for public inspection.7 2 Hopefully this

was unintended: it is without statutory basis and could leave those
trade secrets embodied in agency orders or opinions generally

unprotected. In an interesting attempt by the Grumman court to
prescribe a prospective remedy, it suggested that the Renegotiation

Board delete identifying materials in advance and make all orders and
opinions public as they are declared, cataloging them by code or

number.

71

A doctrine which has developed since American Mail Line, Ltd. v.

Gulick17 1 is that an agency's sole reliance upon a document may
vitiate its exempted status under the FOIA. 7 - This doctrine was
mentioned with approval in Bristol-Myers 76 and has received the
170. 425 F.2d at 580.
171. Id. at 581. While 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970), authorizes deletions from
"opinions" and not "orders," the court extended this provision to cover "orders," since over 90
percent of the Renegotiation Board's actions are by opinionless orders, and the congressional
purpose was to "[disclose] agency action while concealing personal identity." 425 F.2d at 58081 &n.8.
172. That is, section 552(b) might not apply where section 552(a)(2) must be complied with.
173. 425 F.2d at 581. Renegotiation Board regulations require that final opinions need be
made public only to the extent the Board deems them potentially significant as precedents. 32
C.F.R. § 1480.5(a)(1) (1970). Moreover, the regulation purports to exempt all orders, as
defined by 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).(Supp. V, 1970). 32 C.F.R. § 1480.5(b) (1970). The Grumman
decision strikes down section 1480.5(b). There seems to be no statutory basis for section
1480.5(a)(l)'s limitation, since section 552(a)(2)(A) does not make precedential value the
prerequisite to public availability, although materials not made public cannot normally be relied
upon as precedent by the agency under section 552(a)(2). Support for the Renegotiation Board's
position is advanced in the Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note 52, at 15.16, but
Professor Davis has strongly attacked this rationale. Davis, supra note 13, at 771-75.
"174. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
175. Id. at 703. In American Mail Line the Maritime Subsidy Board had for convenience
incorporated five pages of an alleged intra-agency memorandum in an order, and the party
affected by the agency action sought disclosure of the entire document. Since the memorandum
was given as the sole basis for the agency action, the court.compelled its release.
176. 424 F.2d 935, 939 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum).
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support of some commentators. 177 Many questions are as yet
unresolved in this area. Will it apply for announcements of proposed
rule making? The court in Ackerly v. Ley'7 8 did not even mention this
possibility despite the FDA's reliance on "information gathered from
investigations and other sources" in proposing its new regulation.,"
The FDA's notice suggests another problem: may an agency
effectively disguise its reliance upon any particular document, thereby
avoiding public disclosure? The FCC may have failed to announce
any specific details on the materials underlying its fee schedule
changes in In re National Cable Television Association, Inc. 110 and
precluded the argument of reliance, if that doctrine applies to
proposed rules, as well as to orders and opinions.
A final point concerns whether sole reliance on a document for
part of an order or opinion will invoke the American Mail Line
doctrine. This question appears in In re Request by KO WL, 181 where
the FCC expressly used a license applicant's financial statements to
establish the credibility of the applicant's revenue estimates, yet
refused to release the statements to an intervenor opposing the
82
application on financial grounds.
Nature of the Review Process
That the federal district courts are not having an easy time with
the FOIA is evidenced by frequent remand by courts of appeal for
more complete adjudication at the trial level. Ackerly v. Ley'8 has
become an oft-referred to decision for its handling of the review
question. The district court had granted summary judgment for FDA
Commissioner Goddard in a brief memorandum and order.' Calling
the lower court order "abbreviated and tangential,' 8 5s the District of
Columbia Circuit determined that the decision would not lend itself to
an adequate appellate review, the district court having been the only
177. Johnstone, supra note 11, at 304; Katz, supra note 9, at 1274-77.
178. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
179. Id. at 1337, quoting 33 Fed. Reg. 3076, 3077 (1968).
180. 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 985 (1970). The Executive Director expressly rejected the
notion that the Commission had relied on any document or specific data. Id. at 986.
181. 20 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 102 (1970).
182. Id. at 103, quoting 19 P & F RADIO RaG. 2D 149, 152 (1970). The financial estimates
were only one of many elements behind the FCC's eventual grant of the requested license.
183. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
184. Ackerly v. Goddard [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] F.D. Cosm. L. REP.
40,338
(D.D.C. 1968).
185. 420 F.2d at 1341.
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one viewing the disputed documents in camera. Two glaring faults
marred the district court's action. It made no reference to any of the

specific exemptions listed by the FOIA, yet still denied disclosure. 8"
Furthermore, it alluded to the possibility that "diligent research"
could have uncovered the requested material. The court of appeals

sharply rejected any notion that "revelation under the Freedom of
Information Act [is] contingent upon a showing of exhaustion of

one's own ingenuity."'' 8 The case was remanded with directions to the
district court to give an itemized identification of the requested

materials and a full discussion of the basis for exempting from
disclosure each particular document.'18

In Bristol-Myers the court of appeals also remanded to the district
court, which had failed altogether to hold the necessary in camera

review.' The court of appeals emphasized that the FOIA's
exemptions were to be narrowly construed and that the lower court
was responsible for a thorough analysis of the status of the documents

requested to ascertain whether only portions needed secrecy, and if
enforcement proceedings were truly imminent."' Similarly, the

Grumman court cited the A ckerly decision in ordering that, on
remand, the district court proceed with an in camera review of the
186. Id. The fact that the court of appeals relied so heavily on this point seems to place it in
conflict with the court in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), which had held that, even where no specific exemption is available, a court
may utilize its equity jurisdiction regarding injunctive relief to deny this remedy where the
potential harm to the public outweighs any possible benefits. Id. at 806. This rationale by the
Consumers Union court has met with the opposition of many commentators. See the articles
cited in note 9 supra.
187. 420 F.2d at 1342. Some uncertainty has arisen over whether the requester of
information from an agency must have a "need for" or "interest in" the sought-after records.
The issue is complicated because there are two levels of inquiry to be analyzed. One deals with
the requirement that identifiable records be released to any person. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp.
V, 1970). The other concerns the "intra-agency memorandum" exemption which speaks in
terms of litigation with the agency. Insofar as section 552(a)(3) is concerned, American Mail
Line Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969), clearly eliminated any requirement of
need by the applicant for identifiable records. Accord, Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578, 582 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d
523, 525 (7th Cir. 1968). Contra,Shakespeare Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 772, 778 (Ct. Cl.
1968). With respect to the "intra-agency memorandum" exemption Consumers Union
indicated that the inquiry was whether there could be any conceivable litigation with the agency
in which the requested documents might be relevant-regardless of whether the requester is or
may be involved in such litigation. 301 F. Supp. at 804. The standard for discovery to be applied
is the federal standard. GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969).
188. 420 F.2d at 1342.
189. 424 F.2d at 938.
190. Id. at 938-39.
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materials sought.19 1 Apparently, the lower court had granted
summary judgment against the party seeking disclosure. 192 This
tendency for abrupt handling of FOIA litigation by the district court
is typified by Soucie v. Dubridge9 3 where no in camera review is
adverted to, no authorities are mentioned, and no attempt is made to
balance the conflicting interests involved.' 94 The intent of Congress in
shaping the FOIA would seem to require something more.
A very disquieting decision regarding judicial review was Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 9 which affirmed the district court's refusal
to grant injunctive relief against continued NLRB proceedings until
requested information had been disclosed. While the court of appeals
may be correct regarding the lack of power of federal district courts to
enjoin ongoing NLRB proceedings, its characterization, in dictum, of
the applicability of the FOIA's injunctive provisions to the Board as
"dubious" is regrettable and without statutory or judicial support."'
The NLRB is an "agency" as defined by the APA 117 and has been the
subject of a claim under the FOIA. 198 Moreover, the congressional
policy against enjoining the NLRB, which is adverted to in Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,"9 seems to be applicable only to traditional labor law
matters; 210 there is no reason to deny the power of a district court to
order disclosure of documents under the FOIA so long as it does not
attempt to delay or prevent any NLRB proceedings °1
Late in 1970 another decision was handed down which restricted
191. 425 F.2d at 582 n.21. See Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D.D.C. 1970);
Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 179 (D. Md. 1970).
192. 425 F.2d at 579.

193. 27 AD. L. 2D 379 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1970).
194. Cf United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8n.21, 11 (1953).
195. 433 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1970).
196. By finding that the plaintiff had not, in fact, sought the remedy provided for in the
FOIA, the court was able to avoid meeting head-on the issue of the Act's applicability to the
NLRB. Id. at 211.
.197. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
198. See Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1010 (1970). Significantly, the Second Circuit did not deny its power to enforce the FOIA
through an injunction and expressed its opinion that there may be circumstances where the
Board could be required to produce a requested document. Id. at 1006.
199. 433 F.2d at 211.
200. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See generally M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW § 296, at
536 n.10; § 341, at 596 n.2; § 372, at 624 n.22; § 512 (2d ed. 1965).
201. In the context of other agencies, however, a denial of access to relevant information
might well serve as the basis of a "due process" attack on any subsequent proceedings where
such information would have been useful. See Johnstone, supra note 11, at 305.
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the power of federal courts to order disclosure of agency records under
the FOIA. In Skolnick v. Kerner2 a report had been requested from
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Soon after an
action to review the Commission's decision denying access to the
document was filed in the district court, the Commission tendered its
final report to the President. The district court dismissed the
complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
declaring its earlier decision in Skolnick v. Parsonsm determinative of
the issues presented. Since the Commission had terminated its
existence upon the filing of its final report and since no other
governmental authority had succeeded to the Commission's
functions, the court of appeals held that the suit had abated because
there was no one against whom a disclosure order could operate, and,
thus, no remedy under the FOIA.20 While this decision might be
technically correct insofar as the doctrine of substitution of successive
parties is concerned,205 it overlooks the possibility that somewhere in
the federal government the requested document may still be retained.
Despite the absence of a successor" to the primary functions of the
Commission, some other federal agency, such as the GSA or the
Justice Department, may conceivably have succeeded to another of
the Commission's functions-the storage of Commission records.
There should be no bar to the application of the FOIA to these
records, newly transferred from the no-longer extant Commission to
anothei agency as custodian.
Agency Attitudes

Under ideal circumstances only one or two instances of honest
differences of opinion between a private individual and an agency
would require judicial intervention under the FOIA. Such was not the
case in 1970, however. So long as federal agencies persist in their
blatent disregard of the dictates of the FOIA, judicial review will
remain the necessary "club" to hold over the head of administrative
malfeasance.m The court in A ckerly v. Ley0 repeatedly expressed its
202. 435 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1970).

203. 397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968).
204. 435 F.2d at 695.

205. See 397 F.2d at 525.
206. See generally Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Trade
Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. Civ. RirHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 345 (1969);
Nader, Freedomfrom Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LID.
L. REv. 1 (1970).
207. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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displeasure with FDA handling of the information requests at issue.
Especially criticized was the fact that, while the plaintiff had
mentioned in his request that he needed the information to assist in the
preparation of comments in a proposed FDA rule-making
proceeding, the FDA granted limited disclosure two weeks after the
announced deadline for the receipt of comments. 2 8 The District of
Columbia Circuit drolly remarked: "We are not impressed with this
timing ...
"2,1
A similar display of judicial displeasure was present in Wellford v.
Hardin,21 0 where the district court branded the performance of the
Pesticides Regulation Branch of the Department of Agriculture a
circumvention of the FOIA and reminded the agency that secrecy is to
be the exception, rather than the rule.211 Interestingly, the court
balanced its remarks by admonishing the plaintiffs to avoid
unnecessarily burdening the PRD and to request only those
documents they reasonably needed. 212 While the FOIA does not
23
require any allegation of need for requesting identifiable records, it
seems only fair that the public operate in good faith vis-a-vis federal
administrative agencies.
The most unusual example of an agency's attitudes toward
freedom of information in 1970 must be In re Seaboard Broadcasting
2 14
Corporation.
While primarily rejecting the requests for
Commission documents, the FCC did indicate that one particular
letter might be available for disclosure. However, incredibly, this
letter, which apparently had served as the basis for a complaint in a
license revocation proceeding and thus would be publicly available
under FCC regulations, 215 was lost by the Commission, which could
only declare that "when the [FCC Broadcast] Bureau finds the
missing document we expect that it will notify the other parties to the
proceeding .... ",216
.208. Id. at 1338 n.1.

209. Id.
210. 315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).

211. Id. at 770.
212. Id.
213. See note 187 supra.
214. 19 P &F RADIo REG. 2D 831 (1970).

215. 47 C.F.R. § 0.457(g)(1) (1970).
216. 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 835 n.8. The FAA is a striking example of an agency
intransigent in its non-compliance with the FOIA. During the summer, 1970, several students
affiliated with the Center for Study of Responsive Law met repeated delays, hostility, and a

